This paper extends the three major facts of long run structural transformation -(i) sectoral reallocations, (ii) rich movements of productive activities between home and market, and (iii) an increase in the scale of productive units -and develops a model based on scale technologies to understand and explain them within a uni…ed framework. The crucial distinction between industry, services, and home production is the scale of the productive unit. Scale technologies give rise to industrialization, and the marketization of previously home produced activities. The rise of mass consumption leads to an expansion of industry, but a reversal of the marketization process for service industries. Finally, the later growth in the scale of services leads to a decline in industry and a rise in services.
Introduction
"The rate of structural transformation of the economy is high. Major aspects of structural change include the shift away from agriculture to non-agriculture pursuits, and, recently, away from industry to services; a change of the scale of productive units, and a related shift from personal enterprise to impersonal organization of economic …rms, with a corresponding change in the occupational status of labor." (Kuznets, 1971, 2) The process of structural transformation is one of the most salient facts of economic development. As suggested by Kuznets, there are three key aspects of this transformation: (1) the movements of production across broadly de…ned economic sectors, (2) the shift of activity between home and market production, and (3) the increase in scale of productive units. This paper extends evidence on these three observations, and develops a model that uni…es them.
Each of these facts can have important rami…cations for growth, and overall secular trends of development. When production technologies di¤er across sectors, the distinction between sectors is economically meaningful, and reallocations across sectors can have important impacts on long run growth prospects, relative prices, and relative wages. 1 The distinction between home and market production is also relevant, since the vast majority of home production is not included in national income accounts. Home production also a¤ects labor supply decisions, and in turn marital and fertility decisions, all of which show interesting dynamics over development. The scale of productive units can have consequences for the e¤ects of …nancial frictions on development. Speci…cally, …xed costs or a minimum scale can exacerbate the problems of …nancial frictions 2 In our theory, scale technologies are the origin of structural change; a model designed to be consistent with cross-sectoral and secular evidence on the scale of productive units has strong predictions for the movement of production between sectors and between home and the market that are consistent with the data. Scale has this central role for two reasons.
First, we show that the scale of production is the primary technological di¤erence distinguishing the goods and service sectors. Indeed, we argue that scale is the most consistent and meaningful basis of classi…cation. Production that is most e¢ cient when produced on a very large-scale tend to be categorized as goods, while smaller scale production is often categorized as services. So, for example, custom dress-making and tailoring have historically been services, while mass apparel production is industry.
Second, scale a¤ects decisions on home vs. market production. The large scale of manufacturing makes modern home production of these goods irrelevant. In contrast, an important margin between home production and smaller-scale, market services exists. Market services lead to higher utilization of indivisible, specialized intermediates, but home production o¤ers other utility bene…ts. So, for example, the public bus requires less capital per passenger than home production using a private automobile.
Thus, scale technologies are at the heart of both the reallocation of production between the home and market, and between sectors. Economic historians argue that the industrialization and the birth of the factory system was associated with the arrival of a series of economically viable, large-scale technologies (e.g., Chandler, 1990 , Mokyr, 1994 , Berg, 1994 , Scranton, 1997 . These modern scale technologies introduced new industries, but also moved existing traditional home production activities to the market (see Reid, 1935) . We show that even early on market production involved both industry and services, however. As industrialization continued the range of production and industries in these sectors expands, traditional output, such as agriculture, falls as a share of production.
As development continues, the intermediate scale of services play another important role in structural transformation. As incomes rise, and the costs of intermediates in the production of fall, households begin purchasing these intermediates directly, and home producing using modern technologies, rather than indirectly through market services. The home to market product cycle is therefore reversed in later times with the di¤usion of goods to households (see Ramey and Francis, 2006) . For example, an activity like laundry was originally performed using a traditional technology (handwashing), later produced as market services using modern equipment, and has subsequently moved back into the home with the spread of the productive intermediate or durable to consumers.
This reversal of the home-market product cycles is therefore associated with the rise of mass consumption, when consumers purchase goods directly on a widespread scale. 3 By increasing the demand for market goods and decreasing the purchase of services, this spread of intermediates to households not only a¤ects the home vs. market production decision, but also the allocation of market production across sectors. Manufacturing experiences a boom, and the economy experiences a rise in manufacturing relative to services. This is consistent with U.S. experience, in which the peak in the output share of manufacturing corresponds with a peak in the share of consumption expenditures on non-food goods. Finally, the model predicts that the relative size of the service sector is increasing in the scale of services. Home production of large-scale services is relatively more di¢ cult/costly. We show evidence for the United States that the post-1950 growth in services has been driven by a growth in the scale of services.
This rest of this paper develops the evidence, and formally models this theory of structural transformation. In the next section, we review and extend the facts, including documenting the salient patterns of long run sectoral reallocations of output for a set of 29 developed and developing countries. There we also informally develop the argument of scale as a unifying factor behind these facts. Section 3 develops a model, based on Buera and Kaboski (2006) to crystallize the importance of scale economies, while Section 4 presents its implications for the early dynamics of structural transformation, the growth of industry, and its recent decline. 4 Finally, Section 5 extends the model into a more neoclassical, dynamic setting, and Section 6 concludes.
Facts of Structural Change
This section documents key facts on three aspects of structural change: sectoral reallocations of production, rich dynamics between home and market production, and growth in the scale of productive establishments. Figure 1 shows an extended long run time series for the United States of the distribution of current price output across the three major sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry and services.
Sectoral Reallocations
The U.S. exhibits several interesting stylized features of sectoral reallocations over development. First, the share of manufacturing in value-added is hump-shaped, with an extended rise followed by a late decline. Second, this peak also coincides well with the onset in the United States of what Katona (1964) described as the "mass consumption society". This phenomenon was characterized by a rise in households'discretionary spending and the expanded demand for a wide range of goods and services, durables in particular, from the majority of households. 5 Indeed, in the chart above the peak in manufacturing corresponds with a peak in the share of consumption expenditures on non-food goods. 6 Third, the decline in manufacturing corresponds with a late rise/acceleration in the share of services. The fact that the rise in the output share of services occurs only late in development, while recognized by Kuznets, has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Maddison, 1987) . 7 The decline of agriculture, hump shape in manufacturing. and late acceleration in 5 Katona (1964)'s use of "mass consumption" has a double meaning in terms of both quantity of goods, and consumption of the "broad masses". It therefore has some presumption of heterogeneity in income or class. Matsuyama (2002) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) deal with the distribution and productivity conditions necessary for its spread. We instead focus on its consequences for sectoral allocations, and home vs. market production. 6 The consumption data from 1900-1929 is from Lebergott (1996) . The latter data is from the National Income and Product Accounts. Consumption data prior to 1900 is not available at a su¢ ciently disaggregated level to make it comparable to the latter numbers 7 Labor allocations show somewhat di¤erent patterns. In particular, the share of agriculture is much larger in labor terms than in output terms in earlier periods. In addition, the fraction of labor in services grows even early on. The patterns for real output are di¢ cult to compare across countries because of di¤erences in base years and base year relative prices. services are true not only for the U.S., and the small group of countries for which Kuznets had long time series, but are common to many countries. Utilizing recent independent work by economic historians, we have assembled reliable extended time series of current price value-added share data for 29 countries, covering six continents and di¤erent levels of current development. 8 Of the 29, 22 countries -including all high income countrieshave experienced an increase and then decline in manufacturing, while the remaining lower income countries have only (yet) experienced the increase in industry. 9 For the 22 countries, the peak share averages 0.39 (std. dev: 0.04) and occurs at an average per capita income of $7500 (st. dev.: $1800). Pooling all countries, we divide the sample into country-year observations with real income per capita under $7500, and income per capita of at least $7500. Using country-speci…c …xed-e¤ects, regressions of sector share on log real income per capita yield the following coe¢ cients (with standard errors in parentheses):
Sector
<$7500 >=$7500 .
The UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database provides sector speci…c numbers over a shorter time period , but for a much larger cross-section of 161 countries that can be linked to Penn World Tables 6.1 GDP per capita data. 10 The parallel …xed-e¤ect regressions over this larger set of countries yield very similar results: . .
Graphically, Figure ? ? shows these patterns of value-added shares vs.real income per capita for agriculture (top panel), industry (middle panel), and services (bottom panel).
Rich Dynamics Home vs. Market Movements
Historically, and even today in less developed economies, it has been di¢ cult to construct truly meaningful national accounts, since they typically only encompass market activities. 11 In these less developed economies, the advent and spread of industrialization involves the marketization of many formerly home-produced activities. In her seminal work on household production, Reid described this process 12 : "As factory production increased, tasks left the home. At …rst goods were made in both home and factory. The family gave up home production only as they were able to …nd a wider market for the products they had to sell. As time went on, one form of production after another, spinning, weaving, sewing, tailoring, baking, butchering, soap-making, candle-making, brewing, preserving, laundering, dyeing, gardening, care of poultry, and other tasks have wholly or in part been transferred to commercial production. In addition, child care, education, and the care of the sick are now to a large extent carried on by paid workers. At the present time the urban not the rural family is typical; and urban families are dependent on the market even for subsistence goods." (Reid, 1935, p. 47) Two important industries that Reid omits are transportation and trade, both of which became much less home produced over time. Canals, railroads, and, later, mass transportation gradually replaced walking and horse-driven transportation. Similarly, sale of 11 Owner-occupied housing services and self-consumed agricultural output, particularly important in poorer, agrarian economies, are often imputed into national accounts, but home production of most other goods and services are not. 12 Reid's observation was for the United States. Deane and Cole (1967) describe production in preindustrial Britain, where market transactions were more prevalent, but small-scale production in the home still dominated. Even as industrialization increased market production of textiles, many productive activities were still contracted or "put out" to households. Eventually, many of these marketized activities have moved back in the home. Buera and Kaboski (2006) show how many services declined in the twentieth century as important modern technologies and goods di¤used to households. Important product cycles include the decline of transportation services, such as railroads, rail lines, and buses with the spread of the private automobile. The automobile was also related to the decline in neighborhood retail services (food, apparel, ice, fuel, dairy, …ve and dime stores), as was the spread of refrigerators and freezers. 13 Similarly, the spread of washers, dryers, vacuums, microwaves, and other home appliances (see Greenwood et al, 2005) was accompanied by declines in domestic servants, launders, and dry cleaners. Francis and Ramey (2006) cite historical evidence that the spread of many household appliances were associated with increases in household production labor because activities (e.g., bread baking, laundry) moved from market to home production. Many newer activities that have started in the market have also moved toward home production. Examples include the relative decline of movie theaters (spread of televisions, VCRs, and DVD players), mail services (computers, fax machines), and recently internet cafes (computers, cable internet connections).
These examples are quantitatively important. Together, Buera and Kaboski (2006) show that 75 percent of all declining service industries between 1950 to 2000 are associated with identi…able movements toward home production.
Large Scale Technologies
In the model of the next section, scale could be captured by capital, output, or labor per establishment. In the data, we will focus on workers per establishment as our metric or de…nition of scale. We highlight several facts of scale technologies that are crucial in understanding structural transformation. First, industrialization is linked to the introduction of large scale production methods. Second, the scale of services are much smaller than the scale of goods production, and is the distinguishing feature between the two sectors.. Third, in recent decades, the growth in services has been driven by large scale services.
Scale technologies and the industrial revolution
Historians link the industrial revolution with an increase in scale and the rise of the factory system. Still, historians describe a slow process of increasing scale, characterized by the staggered arrival of a series of large-scale technologies (Mokyr, 2001 , Scranton, 1997 .
Even in the early 18th century, new technologies were increasing the scale in agriculture, and setting the stage for industrial growth. These scale technologies involved important tools and investments, seed drills, iron plows, and threshing machine, and, most importantly, enclosures on land. A bit later, the most in ‡uential technologies of the …rst industrial revolution, e.g. textile milling, iron production, mining, canals, and steam power became increasingly economically viable. 14 All led to increases in the scale of production, and required large capital investments. Similarly, the technologies of the second industrial revolution in the late 19th and early 20th century, such as steel, concrete, paper and chemicals, internal combustion engines, electricity, and food processing, led to even larger scales of e¢ cient production, as did increased mechanization in agriculture (tractors, harvesters, etc.). 15 Scale technologies were not particular only to manufacturing, however, nor was the industrial revolution solely a story of industry. New scale production methods required both manufacturing and services in their delivery (Chandler, 1990) . The …gures in the previous section indicate that services were a substantial share of output even early on in industrialization. Services, transportation, retail trade, and wholesale trade, in particular, were important elements even in early industrialization (Mokyr, 1990 , Chandler, 1990 ). Broadberry (2006) argues that new o¢ ce technologies later lead also to an increase in the scale of major services.
The historical accounts of the scale of early production is supported by 19th century U.S. censuses of manufacturing made available by Atack and Bateman (1999) . Most manufacturers were still small-scale, with the median establishment employing just three workers in 1850. Still, there were larger scale producers -means are substantially greater than the means, and scale grew in most industries between 1850 and 1870. Also, the scales of industries associated with the new technologies (steel, textiles, paper, engines, farming machinery) were an order of magnitude larger. These industries also tend to have experienced the largest increases in scale from 1850 to 1870. Appendix A presents these data from major industries that can be compared over time data from the 1850 and 1870 census of manufacturers. 16 In contrast, although the census is only of manufacturers, the smallest scale industries are those most commonly associated with services (dairy, bakeries, crop services, repair shops). For example, there was a large increase in the scale of meat products from 1850 to 1870 that may re ‡ect a transformation of this industry from butchers to meat packers.
Large scale goods, smaller-scale services
The fact that manufacturing involves large-scale production, while services utilizes much smaller scale technologies is a salient characteristic in the data. 17 Production performed on a very large-scale yields goods (e.g. commercial software), while smaller-scale production yields services (e.g., custom software). The histograms of establishment size in Figure  3 show services are overwhelmingly small scale relative to industry. Despite the wide variance of scale in industry, the distributions overlap very little. This distinction is true across each broad industry in the goods sector (including agriculture, mining, utilities, and manufacturing) and services sectors (transportation, services, public administration) with the exception of construction, which is typically in the industrial sector, but has many service-like characteristics. 18 Indeed, we view scale as the most consistent, economically-meaningful, distinction between the goods and service sectors. Over time, classi…cations of producers have changed as the scale of production has changed. Dean and Cole (1967, pp. 138-139) describe the problems of classi…cation that arose from the "radical transformation" of the structure of the British economy. Many occupations were classi…ed in "retail trade and handicraft" in the 1831 census (e.g., wood and furniture, shipbuilding, printing, fur and leather, dressmaking, watches, toys and musical instruments, food/drink and also iron founders, weavers, dyers, and paper) were classi…ed as manufacturing in later censuses. At times, scale has been used as an explicit basis for classi…cation. 19 The scale distinction is economically meaningful because it highlights a technological di¤erence between the sectors. 20 Also, scale a¤ects the home production margin. The least ten establishments in both censuses.This excludes some important large-scale industries with few establishments (e.g., railroad manufacturing), and some industries that were important in only one of the two periods (e.g., gas production and distribution in 1870, but not 1850). As well as some that were dropped due to di¤erences in classi…cation (e.g., books in 1850 vs. miscellaneous publishing in 1870.) 17 The distinction between the size of …rms, determined by contractual arrangements, and the size of establishments/productive units, determined by the e¢ cient scale, is important here. 18 For example, construction is non-tradable, and much of construction consists of small-scale contractors for which their is a home production margin. 19 For example, in the 1927 census, producers of confectionaries, ice cream and sheet iron were deemed to be manufacturers (as opposed to services) if annual production was at least $20,000. 20 We argue that the scale distinction is more fundamental than other distinctions. The examples given economic advantages of large-scale manufacturing pushes production out of small-scale traditional household production. Goods output, which is large scale, has no quantitatively important home production alternative, while small-scale services often involve decisions between home and market production. As the price of goods that lead to scale economies in services fall, many services move back into the home using modern production techniques. These decisions to home produce services a¤ect not only labor supply, and the demand for services, but also the demand for complimentary inputs used in home production. Thus, the introduction of scale technologies, and their falling costs over time, drive both the increase in productive scale, but also changes in output across sectors, and movements between home and market production. During the post-1950 growth in services, the average scale of services has grown, while that of manufacturing has actually declined. Figure 4 displays this by plotting log workers per …rm/ establishment for the goods and service sub-sectors over the period. 21 Moreover, at a disaggregate level the growth in the service sector has been dominated by services whose scale has grown, and who are now among the largest scale services. Using scale and payroll information by 3-digit level from the 1959 and 1997 County Business Patterns,.OLS
show that tangibility of output is not exclusive to the goods sector. Moreover, the tradability and storability of output, two characteristics often cited as distinguishing manufacturing from services, are related to scale, since both are required for centralized large-scale production. Related, Reid (1935) argues that manufacturing is production of form (an object), whereas services are production of circumstance (location, condition, etc.). Clearly, production of circumstance is related to customization, which requires smallerscale production. Along this line, Locay (1990) partially endogenizes the di¤erences in scale across sectors by modeling a multi-stage production process for …nal consumption, where downstream processes tend to be more customized and therefore smaller scale. 21 Data on Figure 4 is from the County Business Patterns. In 1974 there is a change from a "reporting unit" (…rm) concept to establishment. A vertical line signals this break in the series. 
where i represents 3-digit SIC industry (based on IPUMS 1950 coding, which allows us to link it to IPUMS data on schooling levels of workers in each industry), share i is the absolute change in the percentage share of industry in total payroll payments between 1959 and 1997. The positive coe¢ cient on log scale i , the change in log employees per establishment, is signi…cant at a one percent level. That is, industries that have grown in share have been the industries whose scale has increased. This result is robust in two important ways. First, excluding the …ve largest and …ve smallest changes in shares still yields an estimate that is positive and still signi…cant at a …ve percent level..Second, the relationship is not a mere correlate with the relationship between growth and skill intensity observed in Buera and Kaboski (2006) . Controlling for skill i , the fraction of labor in an industry that was college-educated in 1940 22 , yields the following estimates:
share i = 0:31 
The coe¢ cient on log scale i is nearly identical and still signi…cant at a one percent level. Thus, growth in scale appears to be independently related to the growth of disaggregate services.
Summary
We have established seven important facts:
The hump shape in the value-added share of manufacturing.
Fact 2 A peak in the consumption share of non-food goods coinciding with the peak in manufacturing.
Fact 3 A late rise in the value-added share of services.
Fact 4 Rich product cycles between home and market production of activities, including the marketization and later demarketization of many services.
Fact 5
The introduction of large scale technologies identi…ed with the onset of the industrial revolution.
Fact 6
The di¤erence in the scale of productive establishments distinguishing manufacturing (large-scale) from services (small-scale).
Fact 7 A growth in the scale of services during the period of service sector growth.
Fact 8 A strong relationship between the growth in services and their growth in scale.
In the next section we present a model consistent with Facts 5-8, which yields Facts 1-4.
A Theory of Structural Change
We model the consumption decision over a continuum of discrete wants. Individuals also choose whether to home produce or to procure these wants from the market. Production can be done using a traditional or a modern technology. Production using the modern technology requires the use of …xed amount of intermediate manufactured goods in combination with labor to produce up to a maximum scale. To satiate each want requires the use of both manufactured goods and services. In the model economy, as in the data, manufacturing di¤er from services by requiring a larger …xed cost and operating technologies with a larger scale.
Preferences
There is a continuum of consumption wants indexed by z. For each z; households make discrete decisions of whether to consume c(z), and, if so, home produce h(z), each want. Preferences over these decisions are represented by the following utility function:
where wants z z A correspond to subsistence needs (A is for agriculture) that must always be satis…ed, and h (z) c (z) 2 f0; 1g. As will be clear with the discussion of technologies, z indexes the complexity associated with the production of a want. 23 Since 2 (0; 1), home production yields more utility, perhaps because it avoids the disutility of public consumption (e.g., sitting next to others on the bus instead of driving your own car), or because it allows to customize …nal consumption to the particular needs of an individual (e.g., driving your own car allows to use the preferred scheduled and route). 24 
Technologies
Individual wants can be produced using a traditional or a modern (scale) technology. The traditional technology requires only labor as an input and experiences no productivity growth. The modern technology uses both labor and a …xed input of intermediate manufactured inputs to produce up to a maximum scale. Overtime, the productivity associated with the modern technology increases at a constant rate g.
Traditional Technology
Individual wants can be produced using a traditional technology that requires only labor as an input and experiences no productivity growth:
Labor productivity declines with the index of wants z; so that high z goods and services are more complex, and therefore more di¢ cult to produce. The traditional technology does not require manufactured inputs, and therefore exhibits no scale economies. Therefore, all production using the traditional technology is done at home.
Modern (Scale) Technology
We also consider a modern production technology that requires a …xed input and is characterized by an e¢ cient scale of production. In particular, production of goods and services associated with a want z requires a specialized intermediate manufactured input of size q. Given the intermediate input, the technology is linear in labor l up to a capacity of n:
Furthermore, < 1, i.e., the modern technology is relatively more productive than the traditional technology for more complex goods. The modern technology becomes relatively more attractive over time because of technological change at a constant rate g, and as consumption moves towards more complex wants.
Here n represents both the capacity and the e¢ cient scale. For example, if a particular z were laundry, a service, then q might represent the cost of the laundry machine, which enables one to wash n loads of laundry when used at capacity. At home, individuals will produce only one unit of output, and therefore underutilize purchased intermediates, i.e., produce at an "ine¢ cient" scale. For this implication, it is important that the intermediates are indivisible (one cannot be half as productive with half a laundry machine) and specialized (a car cannot substitute for a laundry machine in doing laundry).
Distinguishing Sectors
The …rst distinction between goods and services is made primarily for modeling simplicity. We assume that only goods are used as intermediate inputs, but services are solely …nal consumption. Goods consumption by households solely represents the purchase of intermediate inputs to home production.
The second, and more substantive, distinction we make between sectors is to assume that goods production is much larger scale than services production. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2.
As we show in the following section, production requiring large intermediate inputs q and/or done on a large scale n will tend to be performed on the market. For simplicity we model the extreme limiting case as q ! 1, so that manufactures are exclusively market produced. A further assumption of n ! 1, and q=n ! 0 bounds the cost of goods. Thus, manufacturing production in the market simpli…es to a constant return to scale technology: 25 y M (z; t) = e gt z l M We also make the further simpli…cation that goods are only intermediates and not valued directly in the utility function. Goods will nevertheless be purchased as …nal consumption to be used in household production of services. Including goods as direct …nal consumption 25 Alternatively, we can assume that q n ! , a constant that equals the intermediate goods' share in manufacturing. In this case, manufacturing production in the market simpli…es to a constant return to scale technology with …xed factor proportions: is feasible, but complicates the analysis without yielding much insight. Thus, for every z there is an intermediate good and a …nal service. Finally, within the goods sector we distinguish agriculture as being the least complex goods, those below z A .
The assumption that goods production is large scale makes it market rather than home produced.
Equilibrium
We can now state the household's problem and the competitive equilibrium. For each want z, the household makes three linked binary decisions: whether to consume or not c(z), if so whether to home produce or not h(z), and again if so, whether to use the modern technology in home production m(z):
Normalizing labor as the numeraire, the household takes the wage and the prices of each good p M (z) and service p S (z) as given, and solves the following static problem at each point in time: 
The left-hand size of the budget constraint is total market expenditures, while the right-hand side is income/labor supply.
The …rst-order condition of whether to home produce or market purchase output of a particular z yields the central intuition for the model:
The assumption that goods production is large scale makes it market rather than home produced. This can be seen clearly from the the household's …rst-order condition , i.e., the …rst order conditions associated with the maximization problem in (5) : where, is the marginal utility of income. The bracketed term represents the cost-savings of market production. Both market and home production use labor (valued at the opportunity cost of time w = 1), but the market service requires paying only a fraction (1=n) of the intermediate goods cost, as opposed to the full goods cost from purchasing the input. Households will use the market if the utility value of this cost-savings (left-hand side) exceeds the lost utility from consuming market-rather than home-produced output (right-hand side). Output that requires large or expensive intermediates (high q or p M ), or has a large e¢ cient scale n will be home produced. Hence, our assumption that manufacturing requires large intermediates inputs q and is done on a large scale n justify the statement that manufacturing is market produced. 26 The …rst-order condition with respect to the decision of whether to use the modern technology simply yields that the modern technology is used if the time cost of traditional production sum of the goods and time cost for modern production.
A competitive equilibrium is given by price functions p M (z; t), p S (z; t), consumption, home production, and technology decisions c (z), h (z) and m(z)(associated with purchases of goods and services by households) such that: i) given prices p M (z; t) and p S (z; t), c (z), h (z) and m(z) solve (5) ; ii) prices solve zero pro…ts conditions, i.e., iii) markets (i.e., for labor, each z good, and each z service) clear. Next, we characterize the evolution of the structure of production of the economy. This process includes a shift from traditional technologies to modern (scale) technologies, changes in the wants that are home vs. market produced, and a transformation of the sectoral composition of output and employment.
Evolution of Structural Change
This section presents the results of the paper, which tie in closely with the facts presented in Section 2, given our assumption of large scale modern technologies (Fact 5), and the larger relative scale of manufacturing (Fact 6). Proposition 1 describes the early transition from the pre-industrial to industrial scale economies and the marketization of previously home production activities, while Proposition 2 describes the later phase of industrialization in which activities return to the home as households begin mass consumption of modern technology intermediates. Thus, together the two propositions lead to rich product cycles (Fact 4), and a growth in manufacturing that is tied to the growth in the consumption of non-food goods (Fact 2). Finally, Proposition 3 shows how the share of the service sector is increasing in its e¢ cient scale of production, thus the model matches the relationship between scale and share (Fact 8). Given the recent growth in the scale of services (Fact 7), Proposition 3 predicts a recent growth in the share of services (Fact 3). The corresponding decline in manufacturing, coupled with the earlier increase yield the hump shape in manufacturing (Fact 1).
Early Structural Transformation
In early times, i.e., for a low enough t, only the traditional technology is utilized. Since production using the traditional technology requires no specialized inputs, all production is done at home. Households consume the low z goods …rst, since all z are valued symetrically, but the least complex output is cheapest to produce. An upper bound z 0 (t) de…nes the range of goods that are produced using the traditional technology. Early on, z 0 (t) also equals the most complex want that is satiated z (t). This upper bound remains …xed until industrialization. 27 As productivity improves, the modern technology eventually becomes economically viable. The frontier z(= z 0 ) is the …rst to be replaced by the modern technology, but over time the modern technology becomes more productive for even the less complex output. During this period, the upper range of consumption z (t) increases, and the upper range of consumption produced using the old technology z 0 (t) declines. In particular, there exists a point in time at which the modern technology overtakes the traditional technology for the most complex want that is satiated, z = z 0 :
The timing of the onset of industralization in the model depends positively on the share of intermediate specialized inputs in the modern technologies, q=n, and negatively on the rate of productivity growth in the modern technology and the disutility associated with market consumption. 28 The rise of scale technologies is associated with an increase in z (t) i.e., an expansion of the wants that are satiated, and a decrease in z 0 (t) (a decline of the range of wants satis…ed through the traditional technology). Figure 5 illustrates this process. It describe the average cost per util as a function of the complexity of wants for the traditional (dotted) and modern (solid) technologies. Over time, the average cost per util for the modern technology declines.
Whether the new modern production that was previously traditional occurs as market or home production depends on the e¢ cient scale of services relative to the utility advantage of home-production. If the scale of services is su¢ ciently small relative to the utility advantage of home-production, 1 + q=n > (1 + q), the advent of the modern technology is associated with a rise in the consumption of intermediate manufactured goods by households to be used as input in the home production of services. For these wants, services remain home produced, and there is just a transition from a traditional to a modern technology that utilizes intermediate inputs produced with a large scale technology. In the case of wants for which the scale of service production is large relative to the utility advantage of homeproduction, 1 + q=n < (1 + q), service production using the modern technology occurs on the market.
The model could be generalized so that di¤erent individual wants z had di¤erent parameter q, n, and , and one can think of examples for the two cases. The provision of clothing services would be an example of the former wants that move straight to being satis…ed through home production. 29 Examples of the latter might be laundry, which was washed initially by hand at home, but later washed at a larger scale market laundry utilizing modern laundry equipment, or transportation, which was initially self-produced but increasingly market provided with the introduction of mass transit and rail. For these latter examples, the modern technology requires both market services and manufacturing, and so with growth, both of these sectors increase relative to agriculture. 30 Thus, the model can explain a sizable share for services even early in industrialization, consistent with the evidence shown previously in Figure 1 for the United States.
We summarize the previous discussion in the following proposition. Proposition (Industrialization): There exist two critical periods t 0 and t 1 , t 0 < t 1 , such that: i) for t < t 0 ; only the traditional technology is utilized, the set of wants that are satiated remains …xed, and all production is done at home, i.e., z 0 (t) = z (t) = z (t) = 0; ii) for t 0 t < t 1 ;
(a) the most complex wants are produced using the modern technology, z 0 (t) z z (t), the set of wants satiated expands, @ z (t) =@t > 0, the set of wants produced using the traditional technology contracts, @z 0 (t) =@t < 0; and (b) if 1+q=n 1+q < (>) ; the most complex wants are satis…ed in the market (at home) using the modern technology, and the service and industrial sectors (only the industrial sector) grow relative to agriculture.
The Rise of Mass-Consumption
Eventually the goods cost of producing any particular service z fall enough to induce direct household purchase of the market good and the home production of this service. Services begin returning to home production, but this time using the modern technology. This leads to the mass consumption of manufactured goods that are used in the production of services, and therefore is associated with sectoral reallocations in output: the return of market production to the home increases the demand for the given market good (by a factor of n), and decreases the purchase of the related service. Thus, the manufacturing sector experiences a boom relative to the service sector, and this contributes to the rising section of the hump-shaped manufacturing trend found in the data.
Proposition (Mass Consumption): Assume (1 + q=n)=(1 + q) < . Then, for t t 1 , the most complex home-produced wants are produced using the modern technology, z 0 (t) < z z (t) < z (t), the set of wants satiated expands, @ z (t) =@t > 0, the set of homeproduced wants using the modern technology expands, @z (t)=@t > 0 and @z 0 (t)=@t < 0 ; and the industrial sector grows relative to the service sector.
The model's prediction on this front is consistent with Fact 2, the rise in the consumption of non-food goods. Also, this consumption could be interpeted as driven by a particular understanding of "discretionary spending", which Katona (1964) claimed characterized the mass consumption society. That is, t 1 is the point in time at which households …rst satisfy consumption in ways that are more expensive than alternatives (i.e., the cost of modern household production exceeds the cost of market production). The threshold t 1 is also the point in time in which households consumption of market goods expands.
Large Scale Services and the Decline of Manufacturing
The previous sections have developed the model's ability to deliver a long extended rise of industry. This section focuses on the model's implications for the later decline in manufacturing, and corresponding rise in services. 31 The model predicts that the larger the scale of services, the larger the relative size of services sector. There are two intuitive reasons. First, the larger the scale, the smaller the goods cost per unit. That is, keeping q constant, the share of intermediate goods is decreasing in scale. Second, the larger the scale, the larger the cost savings of market production of services (which produces at this e¢ cient scale) relative to home production. The following proposition formalizes this.
Proposition: Both the share of market services (relative to market goods) and the ratio The proposition is relevant to the recent growth of the service sector and changes in the scale of services. First, given the increasing scale of services (Fact 7), the model would predict a corresponding decline of the manufacturing sector, and rise in services. Second, a model with heterogeneity would predict that aggregations of services with growing scale n would also have growing service shares (Fact 8).
Summary
We have presented three phases of growth consistent with (1) an early introduction of scale technologies leading to industrialization and a relative decline in the importance of agricultural output; (2) a somewhat later expansion of industry associated with mass consumption, and (3) still later expansion of services with the growth in their scale. Figure  6 illustrates the three phases of structural change in the model economy.
Explicit Durability/Capital
In this section, we extend the basic model to allow for the durability of intermediate manufactured (capital) inputs. This is more in line with much of the earlier motivation which involves home durables and market capital goods. It also shows how the model maps into a more standard dynamic model that has similarities to the standard neoclassical growth model, but also yields insight into sectoral allocations.
In particular, we assume that each intermediate input faces one-hoss-shay depreciation at a constant hazard rate . As before there are continuum of wants indexed by z that are provided using labor and capital as inputs. For simplicity, we only consider the limit case where the modern technology is used in the production of all wants.
The preferences over the various wants within a period are still represented by the utility function (1), while the intertemporal preferences are represented the following timeseparable utility function:
where
is a strictly increasing and concave function.
To simplify the exposition, we consider a decentralization in which households own the durable goods used in home-production while the capital used by the market sector is own by a competitive holding company. Under this assumption, the household's problem simpli…es to maximize (7) by choosing the stock of durable goods used in home-production z (t), the purchases of durable goods d (t), the most complex want that is purchase in the market z (t), and the stock of bonds B (t) subject to the time-t budget constraint
where the lef-hand-size gives the purchases of new bonds, market services and durable goods and the right-hand-size the capital and labor income; and the law of motion for the stock of durable goods
where K d (t) = q s R z(t) 1 p m (z; t) dz, as all wants with complexity z < z (t) are homeproduced and therefore q s united of capital is required for production.
Standard optimal control methods can be used to derive the dynamic system imply by the consumer's problem. In what follows we describe a balance growth path of this system.
Provided U (C) = e C , a balanced growth path exists and is characterized by the following two equations:
The …rst condition, the Euler equation, equates the interest rate to the rate of time preference plus a multiple of the growth rate, g . The second condition equates the marginal cost of expanding the set of home-produced goods to the marginal return. The marginal cost (left-hand side) is given by the sum of the rental cost, p m (z; t) q s (r + g + ) and the labor costs, 1 A(z;t) , netted of the savings associated with not having to satis…ed this want in the market, p s (z; t). The marginal return (right-hand side) is proportional to the utility gain of home-production relative to market consumption of a given want, 1
. This last condition determines the (constant) width of the set of services that are provided by the market, z (t) z (t).
The model with durability allows us to study the e¤ect of an increase in the cost of capital on the structural composition of consumption of this economy. Proposition: The share of services in consumption c s is a decreasing function of the cost of capital r.
A larger cost of capital, due to a larger discount rate or capital distortions, leads to a bigger cost advantage of market services that use more "e¢ ciently" the capital input. Interestingly, this result is independent of whether services are more or less capital intensive than manufactures.
Conclusions
This paper has tried to incorporate the e¢ cient scale of productive units into theory, particularly the distinction between the scale of production in manufacturing, market services, and home produced services, and secular patterns on the e¢ cient scale of production. These factors help provide a uni…ed explanation for broad trends of structural transformation, including not only scale, but also sectoral movements, and rich product cycles between home and market production.
We have also presented a potentially important explanatory factor in understanding the recent growth of the service economy: the increasing scale of services, and the increasing importance of large scale services. To the extent, that these large scale may be improperly classi…ed as services, these trends have implications for revisiting sectoral de…nitions in the the national income accounts.
Our emphasis on the importance of scale is relevant to the de…nition of service sector in National Accounting classi…cation schemes. In particular, the NAICS system, which was instituted in the 1990s, moved in principle to a production method concept of industry. Still, it moved many large-scale information industries such as software publishing, printing, and motion pictures were classi…ed into the service sector, while smaller scale activities such as bakeries and custom "manufactures" were moved into manufacturing. Such classi…cations based on the content of what is produced rather than the production method lead to a less meaningful distinction between the sectors. Perhaps such classi…cations need to be revisited.
A Proof of the Results in the Paper
The various results in the paper follows from the characterization of the household's problem. In this appendix we provide a characterization of this problem and we relate this characterization to the propositions in the paper.
Household choose the set of wants to home-produced using the traditional technology, z 2 ( 1; z 0 ], the set of wants to home-produced using the modern technology, z 2 (z 0 ; z], and the set of want to be market produced, z 2 (z; z], where z 0 z z. Thus, households choose thresholds z 0 , z and z to maximize
where p M (z; t) = e gt+ z and p S (z; t) = 1 + q n p M (z; t). The …rst order conditions are
(1 ) + 1 2 = e gt+ z + qp M (z; t) p S (z; t) and 1 = e z 0 e gt+ z 0 qp M (z 0 ; t) where is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, while 1 and 2 are the Lagrange multipliers of the inequality constraints, z 0 z z.
There are 4 cases to be considered.
Case 1: z 0 =z= z In this case, all production is done at home using the traditional technology. The most complex want that is satis…ed using the traditional technology solves:
This corresponds to the pre-industrial economy in which the set of wants that are satis…ed remain constant over time. This will be the optimal solution as long as the following inequality is satis…ed e z 0 < min (1 + q) e gt+ z 0 ; 1 + q n e gt+ z 0 = e gt+ z 0 min (1 + q) ;
This inequality holds for a su¢ ciently early date, i.e., t < t 0 = 1 g log min (1 + q) ; 1 1 + q n Case 2: z 0 =z< z The …rst order conditions simplify to 
Equations (11) and (12) de…ne an upward and a downward sloping curve in the (z 0 ; z) space respectively. It is straightforward to see that @ z=@t > 0 as both curves move upwards with productivity. The e¤ect of technological progress on the upper bound of the set of wants that are home produced using the traditional technology z 0 is given by @z 0 @t = g (1 ) 1 + q n e gt+ z 0 (1 )+ e z 0 1 + q n e < 0, This corresponds to the optimal solution if the following set of inequalities are satis…ed:
1 + q n e gt+ z 0 < e z 0 < (1 + q) e gt+ z 0
Alternatively, this is the solution if 1 + q n 1 < (1 + q) and t 0 < t < t 1 where
Case 3: z 0 <z< z This correspond to the situation after the rise of mass consumption. In this case, the …rst order conditions simplify to
(1 ) = h e gt+ z + qe gt+ z 1 + q n e gt+ z i ,
e z 0 (1 + q) e gt+ z 0 = 0,
and e z 0 + (1 + q) e gt+ z e gt+ z 0 + 1 + q n e gt+ z e gt+ z = 1.
This correspond to the optimal solution if the following set of inequalities are satis…ed:
1 + q n e gt+ z 0 < (1 + q) e gt+ z 0 < e z 0
Equation (16) can be solved for z 0 z 0 = 1 1 log (1 + q) g 1 t
Using (14) and (15) 
Performing standard manipulations we obtain the Euler equation
(1 ) @z (t) @t + @ z (t) @t = r 1 p s ( z; t) @p s ( z; t) @z @ z @t + g
and an equation for the equality of marginal cost of durables to the marginal return of durables q s p m (z; t) (r + g + ) + 1 A (z; t) p s (z; t) = 1 p s ( z; t) (23)
Holding Company' s Problem
We assume that there is a competitive holding company that owns the capital stock used by the market sector. In particular, the holding company purchase manufacturing goods and rent these for a rental price R (z; t) to maximize the present value of pro…ts Balance Growth Path
For a balance growth path we need to have z (t) = z (0) + g t and z (t) = z (0) + g t. Substituying these conditions into (22) h (1 ) g + g i = r g + g 
